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I. INTRODUCTION
"I am hoping for the best. This is a chance to have a life and take away
the obstacles keeping me from doing better in my life."
-R.H.x
* Naomi Cobb is a candidate for Juris Doctor at St. Mary's University School of Law,
Class of 2014. The author thanks Brent Huddleston, Attorney at Law, for suggesting this
topic and the St. Mary's Immigration Clinic for providing her a practical understanding of
the immigration legal system. She also thanks her family and friends for their continued
support and encouragement throughout her education.
1. R.H., whose name will remain confidential to protect his security, is an undocu-
mented immigrant who came to the United States with his mother at the age of eight. His
mother brought him here to begin a life safe from the gangs of Honduras and to have a
better future. He has lived in the United States for nine years and is now majoring in
physical education and pursuing a career in music. R.H. is a DREAMer and when the
hope of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was introduced he contacted the
St. Mary's University School of Law Center for Legal and Social Justice, which has been
offering several clinics to educate the community on DACA and offering services to help
DREAMers complete and submit applications.
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R.H. is one of approximately 1.7 million2 undocumented immigrants'
whom on June 15, 2012 received hope through the initiative "Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals" (DACA), 4 which provides temporary re-
lief from removal.' DACA is a non-legislative policy directive by the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) guiding its departments of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Pro-
tection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
to exercise prosecutorial discretion by deferred action when enforcing the
immigration laws against certain young people who were brought to the
United States as children, know the United States as their home, and did
not intentionally violate the law.6 Deferring action essentially means that
the government will defer commencing removal proceedings and will
temporarily terminate removal proceedings that have already begun for
those individuals, which meet the criteria established in the
memorandum.7
2. Jeffrey Passel and Mark Hugo Lopez, Up to 1.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrant
Youth May Benefit from New Deportation Rules, Pizw RESEARCI CENI-ER (Aug. 14,2012),
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/08/14/up-to-1-7-million-unauthorized-immigrant-youth-
may-benefit-from-new-deportation-rules/.
3. Undocumented immigrant is the term used throughout this Comment to refer to
noncitizens residing in the United States without legal authorization. Because of the na-
ture of this Comment, which deals with the humanitarian values of DREAMers, who are
youth that did not intentionally break U.S. immigration law of their own volition, this
undocumented immigrant term is more appropriate.
4. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, DHS, to David V. Aguilar, Acting
Comm'r, CBP, Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., USCIS, and John Morton, Dir., ICE, on Exercis-
ing Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children (June 15, 2012) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and
Social Justice), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/sl 
-certain-
young-people.pdf.
5. Deportation is the term used colloquially, however "removal" is the proper legal
term for individuals the government deems to be unlawfully in the country and wants to
remove. Deportation, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem (follow "Resources"
hyperlink; then "Glossary" hyperlink; then "Deportation" hyperlink; or "Removal" hyper-
link) (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). Prior to 1997, there were two separate removal proce-
dures, deportation and exclusion. Id. Deportation was the "process of deporting foreign
nationals" already in the country, and exclusion dealt with foreign nationals "trying to gain
admission into the United States." Id. After the enactment of the Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), deportation and exclusion are cohe-
sively referred to as removal. Removal "may be based on grounds of inadmissibility or
deportability" and is managed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Id.
6. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide (Updated), Immia. PoL'y
CENIER (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
docs/deferred_action_for_childhooldarrivals.qa08l712.pdf.
7. Id.
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The Obama Administration claims DACA is an initiative to provide
humanitarian relief to DREAMers8 who have been made vulnerable be-
cause of the outdated immigration system and the failure of Congress to
pass the DREAM Act. Others argue however, that "[the] policy is noth-
ing more than political theater,"' which has starkly polarized the parties
and hindered substantial immigration reform from occurring in the near
future.'o The general consensus is that the immigration system is broken
and that reform is needed," however, Democrats and Republicans differ
greatly on the administration's use of deferred action as a means to fixing
the broken system.12 Immigrant-rights advocates and Democrats hail the
8. The term "DREAMers" comes from a bill known as Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act that was first introduced to Congress in 2001
by Republicans and Democrats to provide a path to citizenship for qualified young people
who were brought to the United States as children without legal authorization, but which
over the years and after many proposed versions has continuously failed to pass. Steve
Manas, Obama Administration Announces Change in Policy Toward Undocumented
Youth, Ru'rGERs (June 20, 2012), http://news.rutgers.edulmedrel/q-and-a-hot-topic/hot-
topic-2012/obama-administration-20120618. The term "DREAMers" also refers to those
individuals who, after the consistent failure of passing the DREAM Act, are now seeking
relief under DACA as they wait for permanent DREAM Act like legislation to pass in
Congress. Id. See generally S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001) (delineating the provisions of the
DREAM Act introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch in 2001).
9. Rebecca Burns, Deferred Action: the Stuff of DREAMs?, IN Ti usS TIMES (Sept.
16, 2012), http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/13821/dream-on/ (questioning whether de-
ferred action will provide undocumented youth the relief they are seeking or cause more
problems); see also Victor Rodriguez, Gingrich- Obama Pulled 'Election-Year Gimmick' on
Immigration, PATRior ACION NFnVORK (June 17,2012,10:37 AM), http://resistance.ning.
com/profiles/blogs/gingrich-obama-pulled-election-year-gimmick-on-immigration (refer-
ring to the initiative as an "election-year gimmick" by the Obama administration to get
votes).
10. See Texas Lawmakers, Immigration Lawyers Discuss Impact of Broken Immigra-
tion System, HousTON CHRON. (Mar. 30, 2012), http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2012/03/
texas-lawmakers-immigration-lawyers-discuss-impact-of-broken-immigration-system/ (ar-
guing that the "extremism plaguing Washington and the strong partisanship brought by an
election year" will prevent immigration reform in the near future).
11. IMMIGRATION PoIcy Gr., BREAKING DOWN n-u! PRouuMs: WIIAT's WRONG
WIm OUR IMMIGRATION SYSTEM? 3 (Oct. 2009), http://immigrationpolicy.org/special-re-
ports/breaking-down-problems-whats-wrong-our-current-immigration-system (explaining
that for the past two decades, while the United States "has experienced dramatic political,
cultural, and scientific advances[,]" its immigration system has remained the same and that
the old laws are "outdated and inefficient"); see also Jesse Lee, President Obama on Fixing
Our Broken Immigration System: "E Pluribus, Unum", ThE W fim HOUSE (May 10, 2011),
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/10/president-obama-fixing-our-broken-immigration-sys-
tem-e-pluribus-unum (stating that one of the major frustrations of the broken immigration
system is that people are breaking the rules, cutting in front of the line, and "so many
illegal immigrants makes a mockery of all those who are trying to immigrate legally").
12. When politicians refer to the "broken immigration system" they are referring to a
broad range of problems that the federal government needs to comprehensively address.
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policy as a "bold response to the broken immigration system."" They
believe that Congress has given enforcement agencies the power to use
prosecutorial discretion and that the Constitution has given the Executive
Branch the authority to implement the law to the best of their ability. 4
As the law itself is fundamentally broken, they believe that deferred ac-
tion is an appropriate means for effectively and efficiently managing insti-
tutional resources while promoting humanitarian values." Republicans
claim the initiative is an unconstitutional use of executive authority that
bypasses Congress's role as lawmaker and ignores current immigration
law.' 6 Although Republicans may not agree with DACA, many are open
to providing DREAMers with other types of relief." However, with a
nearing election and the continued failure of the DREAM Act, many
Republicans view that the unilateral directive as a hasty, Band-Aid type
See IMMIGRATION Poiicy CTR., BREAKING DOWN THE PROBLNS, supra note 11, at 4
(stating the numerous issues with our current immigration system). The major issues in-
clude outdated visa caps, an employment-based visa system that is not responsive to em-
ployers' labor needs, the deterioration of workplace conditions that affect all workers,
lengthy backlogs on visa and citizenship applications, 12 million unauthorized people living
in limbo, expensive and ineffective enforcement measures that are not working, and a U.S.
border that is more dangerous than ever. Id.
13. Annaluisa Padilla, Obama's DREAMER Initiative Is Smart Immigration Enforce-
ment, AM. IMMIGR. LAYWERS AsS'N (June 20, 2012), http://ailaleadershipblog.org/2012/06/
20/obamas-dreamer-initiative-is-smart-immigration-enforcement/.
14. See Marcus Feldman, Fox Hosts Hate Group Leader to Attack New Immigration
Policy, MEDIA MAT-ERS FOR AM. (June 18, 2012, 6:02 PM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/
2012/06/18/fox-hosts-hate-group-leader-to-attack-new-immig/182766 (noting AILA Presi-
dent, David Leopold's contention that "'[a]ll law enforcement agencies' have prosecutorial
discretion, 'including those that enforce immigration laws"'); The Executive Branch, Titi.
Wiirr-- House-, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-governmentlexecutive-branch (explaining
the President's responsibility for "implementing and enforcing the laws written by
Congress . . . ."),
15. See Padilla, supra note 13 (explaining that "[d]eferred action has long been used
by [the] U.S. [] to prevent the removal of immigrants for humanitarian reasons").
16. See Executive Discretion: Mini-DREAM and The Rule Of Law, Ti-w ECONOMIST
(June 18, 2012, 6:28 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/061
executive-discretion (discussing the opinions of certain outspoken Republicans who be-
lieve that the Obama administration has abused their executive power).
17. See Gerry Mullany, Rubio Calls Obama's Dream Act Move a 'Short-Term Fix',
THE CAucus: TiHE Poixrics & Gov'T BLoc, or Two TIMES (June 24, 2012,1:13 PM), http:/
/thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/rubio-calls-obamas-dream-act-move-a-short-
term-fix/ (restating Marco Rubio's statements in an interview to NBC's "Meet the Press"
where he called DACA "a short-term fix to a long-term problem" and talked about the bill
he wants to pass for DREAMers that would provide visas); see also Mitt Romney on Immi-
gration, ON TIE Issuns, http://www.ontheissues.org/2012/Mitt RomneyImmigration.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2012) (quoting Romney as wanting to fix the immigration system in a
way that provides DREAMers with temporary work visas, future green cards upon receiv-
ing an advanced degree, and the possibility of permanent resident status).
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solution that fails to address the intricacies and complexities that immi-
gration reform requires.'
The legal issue is that DACA is not a law; it is a non-legislative rule for
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as deferred action, and as such has
legal limitations that affect DACA applicants and recipients. Deferred
action and non-legislative rules each have limitations. The purpose of
this Comment is to examine these limitations and their effect on DACA
applicants and recipients-those like R.H. This Comment analyzes the
concept that although the Executive Branch has the legal authority to
exercise deferred action within their prosecutorial discretion and may im-
plement that policy by non-legislative means, the policy creates risk, vul-
nerability, and instability. DACA is a means to an end that misses the
bull's-eye." To develop this analysis, Part II discusses the historical and
legislative atmosphere pressuring the creation of DACA. Part III pro-
vides a detailed account of the provisions set forth by DACA, the federal
government's use of deferred action, and the limitations of deferred ac-
tion and how they affect DACA applicants and recipients. Part IV dis-
cusses the limitations of non-legislative rules and how enacting DACA by
such means creates risk for DREAMers. Part V analyzes the future of
DACA and proposes several actions that could be taken to reduce the
vulnerability of DREAMers in the future.
II. How DACA CAME ABOUT
Providing relief to undocumented immigrants is not a new concept.
Over the years, Congress has standardized relief from removal; however,
the extent of that relief has consistently changed as more lenient stan-
dards have been applied during certain periods and harsher standards in
others. Prior to 1940, the only means a deportable, undocumented immi-
grant had to lawfully remain in the United States was to have Congress
enact a private bill.20 Then, the Alien Registration Act of 1940 amended
the 1917 Immigration Act to "suspend an alien's deportation if he could
prove five years of residence in the United States with good moral char-
18. Jon Huntsman, A GOP Opportunity on Immigration, WALL Sr. J., Aug. 26, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443855804577600892810188600.htmi
(claiming that the Executive's policy is the result of political theater politics and merely a
"Band-Aid for young people caught in our immigration laws").
19. The term "bull's-eye" refers to immigration reform and policies that meet the goal
of providing relief without creating additional vulnerability and risk and that also dutifully
consider the complex issues of the broken immigration system by creating policies that do
not encourage amnesty, prevent future illegal immigration, and are bipartisan.
20. See William C.B. Underwood, Unreviewable Discretionary Justice: The New Ex-
treme Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L.J. 885, 888 n.26 (1997)
(citing The Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, 43 Stat. 153).
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acter, and that deportation would result in serious economic detriment to
a spouse, parent, or minor child who was a [U.S.] citizen or a lawfully
permanent resident."2 1
In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) organized and
codified a variety of statutes governing U.S. immigration law into one
body of text. 2 Over the past sixty years, parts of the Act have remained
the same, but others have been amended or substantially modified.23 The
Immigration Nationality Act of 1952 responded to the criticism that un-
documented immigrants were abusing the suspension of deportation re-
lief by eliminating the "serious economic detriment" standard and instead
requiring "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or to
his spouse, parent[,j or child, who is a citizen or alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence," "good moral character," and continuous resi-
dency.2 4 Because of the harshness of the "exceptional and extremely un-
usual hardship" standard, Congress in 1962 amended the hardship
standard by creating two different hardship standards. 25 For serious vio-
lators, Congress maintained the "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship"2 6 standard, and "for those found deportable on less serious
grounds" Congress limited the requirement to "extreme hardship." 27
Today the criteria for terminating removal proceedings are the harshest
they have been in the past sixty years because of the Illegal Immigration
21. Id.
22. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163,
enacted June 17, 1952 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.).
23. See Underwood, supra note 20, at 888-95 (providing a historical overview of "can-
cellation of deportation" relief).
24. Id. at 889-90 (quoting the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L.
No. 82-414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 163, enacted June 17, 1952, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101 et seq.).
25. Id. at 891.
26. Under INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), before its repeal, serious violators
were undocumented immigrants found deportable for the grounds specified in § 244(a)(2)
and § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), including but not limited to, convictions of crimes of
moral turpitude; convictions of an aggravated felony; convictions of violating any law or
regulation relating to controlled substances; convictions of certain firearm offenses; convic-
tions of espionage, sabotage, or treason; convictions of threatening the President; convic-
tions of violating laws relating to the departure or entry of persons in the United States and
importing aliens for an immoral purpose; and/or engaging in terrorist activities. See Un-
derwood, supra note 20, at 890-91 n.43 (quoting INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994),
repealed by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, §§ 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009, (requiring a
showing of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" for serious violators).
27. Underwood, supra note 20, at 890-91 n.42 (citing Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-885, § 244, 76 Stat. 1247); see INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), repealed by
IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009, (creating an exception for
those in Section 1251(a)(4)(D) or those identified in 244(a)(2) or (3) as requiring the "ex-
ceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard).
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Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)." IIRIRA
was created to address the growing population of undocumented immi-
grants; however, under the popular cover of fighting illegal immigration,
the Act "cut[] back long-established rules that limit[ed] [the] abuse and
unfairness" of the government in its role.of enforcing immigration law.29
Pre-IIRIRA, many DREAMers would have had relief from deportation
under suspension of removal."o However, the consequences of IIRIRA
and Congress's failure to pass comprehensive reform has left DREAMers
vulnerable and with limited options for relief.
A. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996
Before the enactment of IIRIRA, INA provided a form of relief called
"[sluspension of [d]eportation."3 ' "Suspension of [d]eportation" allowed
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) to "exercise [its]
discretion to grant suspension of deportation" to a person who proved
that they had been continuously present in the United States for seven
years, proved good moral character, and showed that deportation would
create an extreme hardship upon herself or a U.S. citizen or lawful per-
manent resident (LPR) spouse, parent, or child.32 If EOIR granted "sus-
pension of deportation," the person would receive LPR status.
The passage of IIRIRA 34 vastly changed the immigration laws of the
United States. Congress changed "deportation proceedings" to "removal
proceedings" and deleted suspension of deportation relief, except in cer-
28. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (codifying IIRIRA); see
Underwood, supra note 20, at 885 (claiming that IIRIRA has "severely circumscribe[ed)
cancellation of deportation" by creating stringent new eligibility requirements that the
most deserving undocumented immigrants will not be able to meet).
29. Underwood, supra note 20, at 885.
30. Elwin Griffith, Admission and Cancellation of Removal Under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 2005 Micii. S-r. L. REv. 979, 1026 (2005) ("Congress replaced suspen-
sion of deportation with cancellation of removal in 1996."); see INS v. St. Cyr: The Supreme
Court and Draconian Congressional Criminal-Immigration Laws, UTAi B.J. 8, 10 (2001)
(explaining that IIRIRA was executed in 1996).
31. INA § 244(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (2004); see AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERs Ass'N,
REPRESENIING CLIENTS IN IMMIGRATION CouRT 201 (discussing the relief available under
pre-IIRIRA and IIRIRA immigration laws for the suspension of deportation and cancella-
tion of removal for non-lawful permanent residents).
32. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERs Ass'N, REPRIESENTING CLIENTS IN IMMIGRATION
Cour 201 (citing INA § 244(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994).
33. Id.
34. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
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tain circumstances.15 In those circumstances, Congress has replaced sus-
pension of deportation with "[c]ancellation of [r]emoval" under INA
§ 240.36 The eligibility requirements a person must prove under
"[c]ancellation of [r]emoval" are much stricter than the previous suspen-
sion of deportation provisions. A nonpermanent resident must prove
that: (1) they have been physically present in the United States for a con-
tinuous period of at least ten years; (2) they have good moral character;
3) they have no conviction of an offense that would make them inadmissi-
ble or deportable; and 4) their removal would result in "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or
child."3
The major differences of cancellation of removal are that it increased
the physically present requirement from seven years to ten, raised the
hardship standard from "extreme" to "exceptional and extremely unu-
sual," and eliminated a showing that deportation could create a severe
hardship upon the undocumented immigrant herself.39 IIRIRA also lim-
ited the number of cancellation of removal grants to 4,000 per fiscal
year," and eliminated many avenues for judicial review of INS decisions,
including deferred action.4 1 In cases where an applicant has been denied
cancellation of removal, the Court has consistently denied reviewing deci-
sions made by the Board of Immigration Appeals.4 2
By increasing the continuous presence term and eliminating hardship
to oneself, many DREAMers do not qualify for cancellation of removal.
First, ten years of continuous physical presence is a long time for
DREAMers, especially if they did not come in as infants. Second, elimi-
35. See AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERs ASS'N, supra note 32 (discussing the changes
IIRIRA made to "suspension of deportation").
36. See id. (noting language changes implemented by lIRIRA).
37. See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that if
INS had commenced deportation hearings before 1997 Jimenez-Angeles would have been
eligible for the pre-IIRIRA remedy of "suspension of deportation," but because INS did
not commence proceedings until 1998 after the effective date of IIRIRA, the court held
that Jimenez-Angeles' case was governed by IIRIRA, that those rules are not impermissi-
bly retroactive, and affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision of removal).
38. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2008).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 240A(e)(1).
41. IIRIRA § 306(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see Shoba S. Wadhia, The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. Pun. INT. L.J. 243, 286-92 (2010)
(discussing the federal agency's immunity from judicial review and the "Supreme Court's
reluctance to permit judicial review over prosecutorial discretion.").
42. See Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365, 377 (2nd Cir. 2008) (denying an undocumented
individual's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA)); see also Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. Diai"r oF JusTicr, http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2012) (summarizing the functions of the BIA).
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nating hardship to oneself severely limits the youth who are able to apply
for cancellation of removal. Within their own right, DREAMers are "ar-
guably the most sympathetic population in the United States" because
they have "great intellectual promise," consider the United States their
home, and for many their "immigration status was beyond their
control. "3
There are other factors besides looking at hardship to one's spouse,
parent, or child that have humanitarian value. These include personal
health, education opportunities, and economic hardship. Even if
DREAMers can show that their deportation would have an "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship" on a parent, that parent must be a U.S.
citizen or LPR." However, one of the major issues of DREAMers is that
they were brought here illegally by their parents, many of which are pre-
sumably not U.S. citizens or LPRs. The harshened requirements of the
IIRIRA "Cancellation of Removal" provisions have made DREAMers a
vulnerable group with few alternative forms of relief. Possible alterna-
tives for relief include a case-by-case exercise of prosecutorial discretion
or passing a private bill in Congress." The private bill method has con-
tinuously failed for the past ten years, leaving a directive for exercising
prosecutorial discretion by deferred action a means of last resort.
B. The Failure of Congress to Pass Comprehensive Reform
In order to rectify the hardship IIRIRA has caused DREAMers, select
members of Congress, attorneys, and immigration advocates have been in
an on-going battle since 2001 to advance the Congressional immigration
reform bill called the Development, Relief, and Education of Alien Mi-
nors Act, or the DREAM Act.4 6 However, the bill has continuously
failed to pass for over a decade.47 The purpose of the DREAM Act is to
43. Shoba S. Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency
in Immigration Law, 10 U. N.H. L. Rev. 1, 19 (2012) (discussing the politics of using de-
ferred action in immigration law and in particular for DREAMers).
44. INA § 240A(b)(1)(D); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(D) (2006).
45. See Elisha Barron, The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors
(DREAM) Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 624 (2011) (discussing the relief available to
DREAMers, in particular the relief that the DREAM Act proposes).
46. See With Failure to Pass DREAM Act, a Battle Was Lost but Not the War, Fox
NEWs LATINO (Dec. 29, 2010), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2010/12/29/failure-
pass-dream-act-battle-lost-war/ (summarizing the failure of the DREAM Act over the last
decade and the politics surrounding the Act and predicting a continuing fight for reform in
the future).
47. Id. The DREAM Act has been proposed at least twenty-four times over the past
decade with no version being passed. E.g., 107th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2001); S. 1545, 108th Cong.
(2003); S. 2863, 108th Cong. H§ 1801-1813 (2004); S. 2075, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 5131,
109th Cong. (2006); S. 2611,109th Cong. §§ 621-632 (2006); H.R. 1275, 110th Cong. (2007);
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"allow children who have been brought to the United States through no
volition of their own to fulfill their dreams, to secure a college degree[,]
and legal status."48 The Act would provide conditional status with a path
to citizenship for select undocumented immigrant students who have
been in the United States for an extended period of time, finished high
school, and who attend an institution of higher education or serve in the
military."9 The process of attaining citizenship would occur in phases,
with each phase providing a higher level of status, and would culminate
after a minimum of thirteen years.so
The bill, which is commonly associated with the Democratic agenda,
has a more bipartisan political history than it appears. The Act was first
introduced in 2001 by two Republicans, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)5 1
and Congressman Chris Cannon (R-Utah),5 2 and then directed by Demo-
cratic Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) in 2005.s" The DREAM Act bill
H.R. 1645, 110th Cong. §§ 621-632 (2007); S. 774, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1348, 110th Cong.
§§ 621-632 (2007) (as amended by S.A. 1150 §§ 612-619); S. 1639, 110th Cong. §§ 612-620
(2007); S. 2205, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1751, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 729, 111th Cong.
(2009); H.R. 5281, 111th Cong. § 5016 (2010); H.R. 6497, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3827, 111th
Cong. (2010); S. 3932, 111th Cong. §§ 531-542 (2010); S. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3963,
111th Cong. (2010); S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 952,
112th Cong. (2011); S. 1258, 112th Cong. §§ 141-149 (2011); H.R. 5869,112th Cong. (2012).
48. Barron, supra note 45, at 632 n.72 (citing 147 Cong. Rec. S8,581 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (discussing the history and politics of the DREAM
Act).
49. See id. at 626-27 (discussing the main provisions of the DREAM Act).
50. See id. (explaining that the DREAM Act "provides a [conditional] path to citizen-
ship for select [undocumented] immigrant students in three phases . . . .").
51. Id. at 632 (providing historical context of DREAM Act and showing initial bipar-
tisanship); Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response
to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 115 (2008) (proposing that Senator Hatch's
Republican influence is stunted at a federal level as polarization stunts progress on more
specific issues related to immigration on a state level); Orrin Hatch on Immigration, ON
TiHE IssuEs, http://www.ontheissues.org/international/OrrinHatch_1mmigration.htm (last
updated April 9, 2012) (exposing that while Senator Hatch championed the success of the
DREAM Act he was opposed to comprehensive immigration reform that would increase
policing states bordering Mexico).
52. See Barron, supra note 45, at 632 (citing Student Adjustment Act, H.R. 1918,
107th Cong. (2001) (providing historical context of the DREAM Act and showing initial
bipartisanship)); The Dream Act, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.im-
migrationpolicy.org/just-facts/dream-act (reaffirming steady bipartisan support for the
DREAM Act); Senator Durban Re-Introduces DREAM Act on Heels of President's Immi-
gration Speech, IMMIGR. IMPACr, http://immigrationimpact.com/2011/05/11/senator-durbin-
re-introduces-dream-act-on-heels-of-president% E2%80%99s-immigration-speech/ (last
visited Dec, 14, 2012) (stating that Chris Cannon is a Republican legislator from Utah that
introduced the bill while serving in the House of Representatives).
53. Barron, supra note 45, at 631 (citing S. 729, 111th Cong. (2010) (listing Republican
Senator Richard Durbin as a cosponsor)) (revealing previous bipartisan support for the
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retained bipartisan sponsorship until 2009,54 but even with bipartisan sup-
port the Act never got enough votes to pass,55 and as time passed, rela-
tions between Republicans and Democrats, and, more broadly,
proponents and opponents of the DREAM Act have become more acrid
and sharply divided on the merits of the bill and its implications.s"
The main issue its opponents have consistently professed since its intro-
duction is that the DREAM Act is "amnesty,"" which rewards illegal
DREAM Act); Senator Durban Re-Introduces DREAM Act on Heels of President's Immi-
gration Speech, I MMIG. IMPAer, http://immigrationimpact.com/2011/05/11/senator-durbin-
re-introduces-dream-act-on-heels-of-president%E2%80%99s-immigration-speech/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2012) ("[I]t is important to note that without the federal DREAM Act
introduced by Senator Durbin . . . students would never be able to legalize their status.").
54. James Walsh, The DREAM Act Scam, NEWSMAX (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.new-
smax.com/jameswalsh/dream-act-scam-amnesty/2012/02/28/id/430879 ("In 2009, while
Democrats held the Presidency and super majorities in both the Senate and the House, an
updated DREAM Act failed again, even though it was a major issue for the Hispanic
immigrant community.").
55. See Barron, supra note 45, at 635 (discussing the failure of the DREAM Act and
stating that the November 2010 midterm election was a major defeat for Democrats); see
also Procedural vote on DREAM Act Fails in the Senate, CNN Polrics (Dec. 18, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/201 0-12-1 8/politics/congress.dream.act_1 dream-act-procedural-
vote-illegal-immigrants?_s=PM:POLITICS (explaining the procedural reasons for the bill's
failure); Walsh, supra note 54 ("Arguments against enacting the DREAM Act include
concern for national security, as a rising number of domestic lone-wolf terrorists were radi-
calized in their teens and 20s. Among those immigrants who have become U.S. citizens,
some admit they lied when they swore allegiance to the United States.").
56. Barron, supra note 45, at 632 (emphasizing that the current political debate is no
longer bipartisan and has become starkly divisive on the merits and implications of the
bill); Donny Shaw, DREAM Act No Longer Bipartisan, OrnN CONonRss Bi-oo (May 12,
2011), http://www.opencongress.org/articles/view/2289-DREAM-Act-No-Longer-Biparti-
san (citing the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States as a contribut-
ing factor to the division of support in Congress).
57. Amnesty is defined as:
[a] pardon extended by the government to a group or class of persons, usu. for a
political offense; the act of a sovereign power officially forgiving certain classes of
persons who are subject to trial but have not yet been convicted . . . [u]nlike an ordi-
nary pardon, amnesty is usu. addressed to crimes against state sovereignty - that is,
to political offenses with respect to which forgiveness is deemed more expedient for
the public welfare than prosecution and punishment.
BLACK's LAw DICONARY 99 (9th ed. 2009). See generally Bryn Siegel, Note, The Politi-
cal Discourse of Amnesty in Immigration Policy, 41 AKRON L. REv. 291 (2008) (discussing
the historical overview of immigration reform and the use of amnesty as a politicized
term). According to Republican Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama,
If we pass this amnesty, we will signal to the world that we're not serious about the
enforcement of our laws or our borders . . . . It will say, you make plans-you can
make plans to bring in your brother, your sister, your cousin, your nephew, your
friend, into the country illegally as a teenager, and there will be no principled reason
in the future for the next congress then sitting to not pass another "dream" act. And it
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behavior and does not effectively prevent future floods of illegal immi-
gration.s Another concern is that once benefactors receive legal status,
they then would be able to petition for the admission of their relatives59
and would receive education benefits and public benefits at the expense
of legal residents and citizens.' There is also strong disagreement over
whether the Act would boost the economy or cost the government
money.6' Others oppose the DREAM Act because it is merely an immi-
gration provision rather than part of a comprehensive immigration plan
to overhaul the broken immigration system."
will only be a matter of time before that next group illegally here will make the same
heartfelt pleas that we hear today.
Procedural Vote on DREAM Act Fails in the Senate, CNN PoiTIcs (Dec. 18,2010), http://
articles.cnn.com/2010-12-18/politics/congress.dream.act_1_dream-act-procedural-vote-ille-
gal-immigrants?_s=PM:POLITICS.
58. See Bob Dane & Kristen Williams, Amnesty for Illegal Aliens Begins Today and
Congress Couldn't Care Less, Fox NEws (Aug. 15,2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/
2012/08/15/amnesty-for-illegal-aliens-begins-today-and-congress-couldnt-care-less/ (provid-
ing an example on how immigrants are afforded amnesty by not having to be interviewed
as a part of immigration procedures); Brian Naylor, Democrats Push DREAM Act; Critics
Call It Amnesty, NPR (Dec. 6. 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/201012/06/131796206/
democrats-push-dream-act-critics-call-it-amnesty ("Opponents say the DREAM Act is
likely to cost some $6 billion a year-a charge backers say doesn't add up-[ ]fewer jobs
for U.S.-born workers."); but cf The Dream Act: Myths and Facts, CONNECING OuR
WORi o, http://www.connectingourworld.org/get-involved/reaching-for-a-dream/the-
dream-act-myths-and-facts/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012) (stating opponents to the DREAM
Act overlook opportunities this piece of legislation provides for immigrants that want to
make a positive contribution to the nation of the United States).
59. Get the Facts on the DREAM Act, Tin- Wiir HousE: (Nov. 30, 2010), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/12/01/get-facts-dream-act.
DREAM Act beneficiaries would only be able to petition for entry of their parents or
siblings if they have satisfied all of the requirements under the DREMA Act. Even
then, they would be subject to the same annual caps waiting periods in order to peti-
tion for their relatives; the bottom line is that it would take many years before parents
or siblings who previously entered the country illegally could obtain a green card.
Id.
60. Contrary to arguments made by the opposition, the DREAM Act does not pro-
vide access to federal funding for education unless they actualize into a U.S. citizen. See
Kelsey Sheehy, States' DREAM Acts Could Deter High School Dropouts, U.S. Nvws (Aug.
6, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.usnews.comleducation/high-schools/articles/2012/07/271
states-dream-acts-could-deter-high-school-dropouts (stating that applicants must meet
state residency requirements to be eligible for higher education tuition.).
61. Barron, supra note 45, at 644-47 (discussing that with the current competition for
jobs and extremely limited state resources the educational and public benefits proposed by
the DREAM Act is a real concern that cannot be brushed aside by DREAM Act
advocates).
62. Id. at 647 n.174; Statement of Administration Policy, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.aila.com/content/default.aspx?docid=23685.
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These are real and valid concerns that are presenting a major road-
block to immigration reform and need to be approached at face value and
with a willingness of both parties to compromise and cooperate.6 3 Unfor-
tunately, the issue is so politically driven that all previous bipartisan ef-
forts have unraveled.' Even with a Democratic majority in both Houses
of Congress from 2008 to 2010, the Obama Administration failed to pass
the DREAM Act.65 President Obama, who supported the Act in 2005 as
Senator and made campaign promises to make immigration reform a pri-
ority in his administration, has been unsuccessful in dispelling the current
congressional stalemate to get comprehensive reform passed. In order
to pass the DREAM Act in the future, the Act "should be further re-
stricted to ensure that only the most deserving and faultless individuals
may take advantage of the bill and it should be combined with increased
enforcement measures aimed at other populations of illegal immi-
grants."" In addition to increasing enforcement measures, Democrats
should focus on the potential areas of cooperation and compromise, such
as lowering the age of eligibility, more clearly defining the "good moral
63. See Obama Says DREAM Act Hasn't Changed Since Republicans Supported It,
Only Politics Has, PourlACr (2012), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/
201 2/jun/26/barack-obama/obama-says-dream-act-hasnt-changed-republicans-sup/ (ex-
plaining that revisions since the first proposal of the bill have been more restrictive in
access thus appealing to conservatives).
64. See Jennifer Bendery, John Boehner Blames Obama For Derailing Dream Act Af-
ter He Derailed Dram Act-Style Bill, Huiiw. Pos-r Poi trics (June 19, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/19/john-boehner-obama-dream-act-n_1609147.html (ex-
pressing that the political environment is hostile and even more so now with DACA, that
comprehensive bipartisan reform seems unlikely, and also showing that there is a blame
game that further heats the political environment).
65. See David Freelander, Senate Fight Over Filibuster Reform Rages, With Eye on
Nuclear Option, TimF DAILY BEAST (Dec. 13, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.
com/articles/2012/12/13/senate-fight-over-filibuster-reform-rages-with-eye-on-nuclear-op-
tion.html (citing how the inability to discuss bills such as the Employee Free Choice Act
and the DREAM Act in the Senate resulted in the failure of passing either even with
Democrats controlling both chambers of Congress).
66. Barron, supra note 45, at 634-35; see also Corey Dade, Obama's Deportation Poli-
cies Have Failed, Immigrant Advocates Say, NPR (June 11, 2012,6:36 PM), http://www.npr.
org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/06/11/154782404/immigrant-advocates-obamas-deportation-
policy-a-failure (asserting that attaching the DREAM Act to the National Defense Au-
thorization Act of 2010 did not go unnoticed by Republicans who flexed their political
muscle by striking down the National Defense Authorization Act along with the DREAM
Act).
67. Barron, supra note 45, at 655 (concluding that more cooperation and compromise
is needed and that there are areas of the DREAM Act that could be altered a bit more to
create a more balanced, bipartisan plan).
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character" requirement, tightening the waiver and hardship exceptions,
and possibly cutting back on other types of legal immigration.68
Even though the Obama Administration greatly increased the agency's
enforcement measures" and provided clear direction that its priority is to
efficiently use its resources by prioritizing the removal of criminals,70 the
stalemate continues and DREAMers are still no closer to getting legisla-
tive relief. Because of the harshness of IIRIRA and the continued failure
of the DREAM Act, DREAMers have become an increasingly vulnera-
ble group and have few options left for relief. Since IIRIRA, the role of
prosecutorial discretion as deferred action has become increasingly im-
portant in the immigration context,71 and in many cases has become the
only means for averting the extreme hardship associated with the re-
moval of certain classes of individuals. 72 Therefore, DACA has been
68. Id. at 647-54 (discussing areas of the DREAM Act where there is room for coop-
eration and compromise for moving the DREAM Act forward).
69. Obama's administration has deported almost 1.5 million unauthorized immigrants,
which is more than the first six and half years of George Bush's administration and higher
than any other period in history. Alex Nowrasteh, President Obama: Deporter in Chief,
FORBES (July 30, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexnowrasteh/2012/07/30/
president-obama-deporter-in-chief/; see Ice Total Removals, ICE.ORG (Aug. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdflero-removalsl.pdf (noting that
President Obama deported more immigrants in his first term as President than President
George W. Bush achieved in a little over six years). See generally DHS, 2010 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGR. STATISTIcS (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrarylassets/statis-
tics/yearbook/2010/ois yb_2010.pdf (showing statistical data on immigration to the United
States since 1890).
70. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Directors, All
Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Ap-
prehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) (on file with The Scholar:
St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (discussing how agency em-
ployees should exercise prosecutorial discretion, the factors they should consider, and
making those who present security issues a high priority for enforcement); Secure Commu-
nities: Get the Facts, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/secure communities/get-the-facts.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2012) (discussing ICE's "Secure Communities" initiative to focus its re-
sources and prioritize the removal of individuals who have a criminal history or pose a
significant threat to the public through an information-sharing partnership between ICE
and the FBI to identify undocumented, criminal immigrants).
71. See Carolina Nailez, Recognizing the Role of Discretion in the Immigration System,
JURIST (Aug. 16, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/08/carolina-nunez-immigration-discre-
tion.php (discussing the increasing role that deferred action has been playing and a shift to
a more "nuanced approach to immigration law that accounts for individual
circumstances.").
72. See Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, and the Vexing Cases(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BiL RTs. (forth-
coming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2081835
(discussing that because getting a unanimous vote for private bills is difficult and has only
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used by the Obama Administration as a last resort effort to help
DREAMers who are in desperate need for relief. The rest of this com-
ment addresses the issue of the Executive's authority to implement
DACA and how such policy making fails to provide the type of relief
DREAMers and this country deserve from its leaders.
III. DACA AND DEFERRED AcTiON
The intention of DACA is admirable in that it seeks to protect a class
of individuals who historically have been eligible for relief and now have
been made vulnerable by a harsh and inefficient immigration system. Al-
though there are those who claim that the presidential directive calling
for deferred action is an over-extension of the Executive's authority that
bypasses Congress, the use of deferred action is a legitimate legal tool
that the government has used consistently in immigration since the 1970s
to avert extreme hardship, use resources efficiently, and promote human-
itarian values." However, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by de-
ferred action, a.k.a. DACA, has legal limitations that present DREAMers
with substantial risk.7
A. What is DACA?
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is a memorandum
that was issued on June 15, 2012 by the Secretary of Homeland Security,
Janet Napolitano, and is titled "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children." 5
While this guidance took effect immediately, ICE and USCIS imple-
been accomplished in a few instances (e.g. VAWA), deferred action is a final avenue to
relief from enforcement).
73. See Shoba S. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244-47 (2010) (discussing the theories underlying the use of
prosecutorial discretion and affirming that goals of prosecutorial discretion include saving
costs and resources and promoting humanitarian values).
74. See Joel Rose, For Undocumented Youth, New Policy Carries Risks, NPR (Aug.
15, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/15/158872445/for-undocumented-youth-
new-policy-carries-risks (discussing that DACA comes with risks such as what the govern-
ment will do with applicants' information if they are rejected and how it will affect unem-
ployed Americans); see also Rafael Carranza, Deferred Action Applications Comes with
Risks: Immigration Attorney, VALLEYCENTRAL (Aug. 19,2012, 10:52 PM), http://www.val-
leycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=790375 (discussing the risks of DACA, including its dis-
cretionary nature, that it is a brand new process, that it is not a change of law but merely a
change of policy, and the fear of what will happen to the policy after the presidential
election).
75. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4 (introducing DACA crite-
ria to be considered in these cases and detailing why young people brought to this country
as children should be subject to prosecutorial discretion when it comes to their cases).
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mented their application processes on August 15, 2012. The purpose of
the non-legislative directive is to instruct the various departments of
Homeland Security (DPS), including Immigration Customs and Enforce-
ment (ICE), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), to exercise their prosecutorial discretion
by deferring action when enforcing immigration law against certain young
people who would benefit from DREAM Act legislation-i.e., those who
were brought to the United States as young children, who do not present
a risk to national security or public safety, and who pursue an education
or serve in the military. 7 The memorandum states that these individuals
are a low enforcement priority and that deferring action is a humanita-
rian" and efficient use of the government's limited resources.7 9
By deferring action, the government is exercising its discretion to defer
commencing removal proceedings or temporarily terminate removal pro-
ceedings that have already begun.so In order to be considered for de-
ferred action, an individual must statisfy the following:8
* Came to United States before the age of sixteen;8 2
* Was under the age of thirty-one and had no valid immigration sta-
tus on June 15, 2012;83
* Have continuously resided in the United States between June 15,
2007 and the present;84
76. See id. (directing ICE and USCIS "to begin implementing [the] process within 60
days of the date of this memorandum.").
77. See id. (stating criteria to be considered by ICE, CBP, and USCIS in handling
deferred action for low threat cases).
78. See id. (noting that the enforcement of immigration laws in a strong and sensible
manner means considering the individual circumstances of each case, refraining from re-
moving "productive young people to countries where they may not have lived or even
speak the language," and that these young people may have "contributed to our country in
significant ways.").
79. See id (stating that "young people who were brought to this country as children
and know only this country as home . . . [are] low priority cases" on whom enforcement
resources should not be expended in order to focus on those who meet the Department's
enforcement priorities).
80. David W. Leopold, What Legal Authority Does President Obama Have to Act on
Immigration?, BLOOManmG LAW RE vomrs (May 16, 2011), http://www.aila.org/content/
default.aspx?docid=35404.
81. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4 (outlining the criteria that
should be considered before employing deferred action).
82. Id.
83. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide, supra note 6.
84. See Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration's Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CENTZER (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.nilc.org/
FAQdeferredactionyouth.html (explaining that an applicant can prove continuous resi-
dence by "submitting a document for each 12-month period since June 15, 2007" and if
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* Is currently in school," has graduated from high school, has ob-
tained a general education development certificate, or is an honor-
ably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of
the United States; and
* Have not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misde-
meanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, 7 or otherwise
pose a threat to national security or public safety.
In order to apply, an applicant must be fifteen years or older, unless the
individual is in removal proceedings or has a final order of removal or
voluntary departure." They must also pass a background check and be
able to prove that they meet the above criteria through verifiable docu-
mentation." Also, applicants should not leave the United States.o .
they cannot, applicants may consider "submitting affidavits from at least two individuals
who have personal knowledge that [they] were in the [United States]" from 2007 until the
present).
85. Id. In school means, an applicant:
[M]ust be enrolled in:
1) a public or private elementary school, junior high or middle school, high school,
or secondary school;
2) an education, literacy, or career-training program (including vocational training)
that is designed to lead to placement in postsecondary education, job training, or
employment, and where you are working toward such placement; or
3) an education program assisting students either in obtaining a regular high school
diploma or its recognized equivalent under state law (including a certificate of com-
pletion, certificate of attendance, or alternate award), or in passing a GED exam or
other equivalent state-authorized exam.
Id.
86. Id. A misdemeanor is a
crime for which the maximum term of imprisonment is one year or less but more than
five days ... [and includes] [an offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse or exploita-
tion; burglary; unlawful possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or traffick-
ing ... [or an offense] for which [one was] sentenced to more than 90 days in custody.
Id.
87. Id.
Any misdemeanor (not meeting the definition of 'significant misdemeanor') for which
you are sentenced to at least one day in custody . . . [does not include] immigration-
related offenses created by state immigration laws as being misdemeanor offenses or
felonies. For instance, Arizona, Alabama, and other states have passed laws that
make it a crime for undocumented people to engage in many everyday actions.
Id.
88. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide, supra note 6.
89. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4 (explaining that no appli-
cant for deferred action as outlined in the memo will receive such action until they have
undergone a background check); see also Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Admin-
istration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, supra note 84 (explaining that docu-
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For individuals who meet the criteria and pass the background check,
DACA may be applied on a case-by-case basis in four scenarios: 1) indi-
viduals who are encountered by ICE, CBP or USCIS;" 2) individuals
who are in removal proceedings but not yet subject to a final order of
removal;9 2 3) individuals subject to a final order;" and 4) individuals who
are not currently in removal proceedings. 4 For those whom ICE, CBP,
or USCIS encounter, ICE and CBP should immediately exercise their
discretion to prevent individuals from being placed in removal proceed-
ings or being removed, and USCIS should issue "Notices to Appear" in
accordance with the memorandum.95
For individuals who are in removal proceedings but not yet subject to a
final order of removal, ICE should immediately begin to offer deferred
action for a period of two years, subject to renewal, as part of their case-
by-case review, and ICE should implement a process where individuals
who believe they meet the criteria can request the ICE Office of the Pub-
lic Advocate to review their case.9 For individuals subject to a final or-
der, USCIS should implement a process where those individuals,
ments such as "financial records (lease agreements, phone bills, credit card bills), medical
records, school records (diplomas, GED certificates, report cards, school transcripts), em-
ployment records, and military records" provide proof for meeting the memorandum's
criteria).
90. See Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration's Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, supra note 84 (explaining that traveling outside of the United States
after August 15, 2012 will cause applicants to lose their eligibility for deferred action, un-
less they have applied for and received advance parole which would allow them to leave
for humanitarian, employment, and educational reasons, but even advance parole does not
guarantee that they will be able to return).
91. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4 (stating that deferred ac-
tion will be considered on a case-by-case basis, one such case being with illegal immigrants
who are encountered by ICE, CBP, and USCIS).
92. See id. (stating that deferred action will be considered on a case-by-case basis, one
such case being with individuals who have not yet been issued final removal orders).
93. See id. (showing that on a case-by-case basis, DACA may be available for illegal
immigrants who are subject to final orders from immigration agencies).
94. See id. (affirming that deferred action can be considered for illegal immigrants
who are not currently in removal proceedings).
95. Id.
96. See id. (explaining the process that should be followed when an individual is in a
removal proceedings, but has not yet been subject to a final removal order); see also Fre-
quently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Ar-
rivals, supra note 84 (explaining that for those who are currently detained by ICE and
where ICE is currently reviewing their case, ICE should offer them deferred action if ICE
identifies the case as meeting the eligibility requirements outlined in the memorandum,
and if ICE has not reviewed their case, those detained should inform their detention of-
ficer or contact the ICE Office of the Public Advocate).
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regardless of their age, may request deferred action." For individuals not
in removal proceedings, USCIS should establish a process for individuals
fifteen years or older to request deferred action." Even if an individual
meets all the criteria, DHS has the discretionary authority to not grant
deferred action.99 However, when an individual has been approved for
deferred action, it should extend for a period of two years, subject to
renewal.'"
When an individual requests deferred action from USCIS, their infor-
mation, "including information about family members and guardians, will
not be shared with ICE [or] . . . CBP for the purpose of deportation pro-
ceedings unless [their] case involves fraud, a criminal offense, a threat to
public safety or national security, or other exceptional circumstances.""oi
However, the information "may be shared with national security and law
enforcement agencies, including ICE or CBP, for purposes other than de-
portation . . . ."'o2 Purposes other than deportation include "identify[ing]
or prevent[ing] fraudulent claims, for national security purposes, or for
the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense."' If deferred ac-
tion is denied because of a criminal offense, fraud, a threat to national
security or public safety, or exceptional circumstances, USCIS shall refer
97. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4 (stating that a process
should be implemented within sixty days of receipt of the memo to handle cases pertaining
to those individuals that are subject to a final removal order).
98. Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration's Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, supra note 84. An individual can apply for deferred action by submit-
ting the 1-821D "Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" form together
with the 1-765 and 1-765WS forms requesting a work permit to USCIS. Id. If USCIS finds
that the request is complete, a receipt notice will be sent, followed by an appointment
notice to visit to be fingerprinted and photographed. Id. Applicants are notified of final
determination by USICS in writing. Id. "The application fee is $465, which consists of a
$380 fee for the employment authorization application and $85 fee for fingerprints. Fee
waivers are not available. However, fee exemptions [may] be available in limited circum-
stances." Id. The request should include evidence that you are eligible for deferred action
under the criteria outlined in the memo. Id.
99. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4 (emphasizing that "DHS
cannot provide any assurance that relief will be granted in all cases."); see also FAC: The
Obama Administration's Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, NAT') IMMIGca. LAW
C1ruNI-, http://www.nilc.org/FAQdeferredactionyouth.html (last updated Sept. 27, 2012)
(clarifying that even if an applicant meets the requirements for deferred action outlined in
the memorandum, DHS still has the discretion to decide if they will grant it).
100. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4.
101. Frequently Asked Questions: The Obarna Administration's Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, supra note 84.
102. Id.
103. Id. Information disclosed in a deferred action request may be used for certain
purposes, but never in regards to the deportation of a family member.
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the case to ICE; however if there is no evidence of those circumstances, it
is against USCIS policy to refer cases to ICE. 0 4
When deferred action is granted by ICE or USCIS, USCIS shall accept
and may approve applications for work authorization during the two-year
period of deferred action.' 05 To receive work authorization, applicants
must prove financial necessity.' 06 DACA does not ensure that approved
applicants will also be able to get a driver's license' 0 7 or in-state tui-
tion. 08 It is important to note that DACA is only temporary and can be
terminated at any time at the agency's discretion;'0 9 renewal is based on
the agency's discretion;"10 it does not absolve any previous or subsequent
periods of unlawfulness;"' it does not extend to the recipients' family
members;" 2 and it does not confer a "substantive right, immigration sta-
tus[,] or pathway to citizenship.""'
B. Deferred Action and the Federal Government's Role in Immigration
Law
The DACA Memo concludes by stating that "[o]nly the Congress, act-
ing through its legislative authority, can confer [sic] rights" of immigra-
tion status or citizenship, and that it is the Executive Branch's role to
"'set forth policy for the exercise of discretion within the framework of
the existing law """ Opponents of DACA are concerned that these dis-
tinct roles have been compromised and that the Executive Branch has
overstepped its authority by pushing policy that goes against the will of
104. Id.
105. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4.
106. U.S. CIIZENSIP AND IMMIGRATION SE-RVICES, 1-765, APPLICATION FOR EM-
PLOYMENT AurnoUZAION, avalailable at www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem (fol-
low "Forms" hyperlink; then "1-765, Application for Employment Authorization"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (listing work authorization forms and application
instructions). The requirements are such that the applicant must establish economic neces-
sity under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(14), (18) and 8 CFR 214.2(f).
107. Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration's Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, supra note 84. Driver's license eligibility requirements for immigrants
vary by state. Id. Deferred action is listed in the federal Real ID Act as a basis of eligibil-
ity for a license, and arguments have been made in support of granting driver's licenses to
deferred action recipients. Id. Even so, the granting of driver's licenses is not guaranteed
and may take advocacy to make such request a reality for deferred action recipients. Id.
108. Id.
109. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide, supra note 6.
110. Id.
111. Frequently Asked Questions, lci.Gov (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.ice.
gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/faq-deferred-action-process.pdf.
112. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide, supra note 6.
113. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4.
114. Id.
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Congress and confers benefits it has no authority to bestow.' 15 This com-
ment will show that the Executive Branch has the authority to set forth
policy that directs the exercise of prosecutorial discretion such as de-
ferred action; however, it is not without limitations.
The federal government has supreme power over immigration.' 16 Al-
though Congress and the Executive Branch share this power, they have
different roles. Under a federalist system of government, it is Congress's
role to legislate for the general interest of the nation and foster harmony
within the United States."' Because immigration is an area that requires
national uniformity,"" Congress constructs this uniformity by creating a
comprehensive, regulatory scheme"' and defining the Executive
Branch's authority by statute.120 The President and Congress then create
administrative agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security
and its sub-units,' 2 ' to promulgate and enforce those regulations. It is the
115. See Executive Discretion, supra note 16 (showing that some outspoken Republi-
cans believe that the Obama administration has abused their executive power).
116. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (holding that "[tihe passage of
laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores
belongs to Congress, and not to the States."); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (finding that the federal government has the exclusive right to regu-
late immigration in order to maintain "absolute independence and security throughout its
entire territory.").
117. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972) (discussing that immigra-
tion is an area of national import that requires uniformity and that Congress through its
plenary power is to govern immigration issues); see also Donald H. Regan, How to Think
About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94
Micai. L. Ri-v. 554, 555-56 (1995) (explaining that it is Congress who "legislate[s] . .. for
the general interests of the union" and provides "harmony [within] the United States.").
118. See United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero, 963 F. Supp. 933, 1078 (S.D. Cal.
1997) (indicating that it is within Congress's exclusive authority to regulate commerce); see
also U.S. CONs'r. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations and among the several States.").
119. See id. (discussing that Congress regulates the immigration sphere "by passing [a]
comprehensive, detailed regulatory scheme" which is "embodied in the Immigration and
Nationality Act."). The act stands as its own body of law, but is also contained in the
United States Code (U.S.C.) under Title 8. 8 U.S.C. "Aliens and Nationality."
120. 18A Fed. Proc., L. Ed § 45:3 (Sept. 2012) (citing Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455
(11th Cir. 1983), on reh'g, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), judgment aff'd, 472 U.S. 846, 105
S. Ct. 2992, 86 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1985)).
121. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) by combining twenty-two different federal departments and agencies into
a unified and integrated cabinet agency to prevent United States' vulnerability to terrorism
and enhance national security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 111, 121
(2006); see Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. DHS, http://www.dhs.
gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last visited Dec. 9, 2012) (describing how
DHS was initially created and subsequently modified); see also Key DHS Laws, U.S. DHS,
http:// www.dhs.gov/key-dhs-laws (last visited Dec. 9, 2012) (identifying key DHS laws
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role of the Executive and its agencies, however, with authority granted by
Congress, to decide exactly how to promulgate and enforce those
regulations.12 2
The Department of Homeland Security is the cabinet department of
the U.S. federal government created to "secure the nation from the many
threats we face."12 3 In order to carry out this mission, DHS delegates
regulatory responsibilities to sub-units or operation components, and it
oversees these components to make sure its regulatory initiatives align
with this mission.12 4 The U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, U.S.
Customs & Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration & Customs En-
forcement are the units that specifically assist DHS with its immigration
functions.'2 5 These functions or services include "asylum, citizenship, and
green card applications; border-related enforcement action such as bor-
der patrol and inspections; and interior enforcement activities, such as the
detention and removal of noncitizens."' 2 6
The decision to place an undocumented immigrant in removal proceed-
ings belongs exclusively to DHS. 2 1 Not all undocumented immigrants
residing in the United States are placed in removal proceedings. 2  Some
are removed expeditiously, while others are considered for prosecutorial
discretion. 129 When DHS decides to charge a foreign-born individual
with violating immigration law, the Department of Justice's Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), the immigration court system,
adjudicates the cases and decides whether that individual should be re-
across different fields, from Immigration and Border Control, to Maritime and Transporta-
tion Security, to Emergency Management).
122. See Regulations and the Rulemaking Process, OFICE OF INFo. & REGULATORY
AFFAIRs, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last visited Dec. 9, 2012) (dis-
cussing Congress's process for promulgating rules which permit agencies to have the dis-
cretion and authority to issue regulations).
123. About DHS, U.S. DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs (last visited Dec. 9, 2012).
124. See Department Components, U.S. DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/ department-com-
ponents (last visited Dec. 9, 2012) (recognizing the agency's major components, including
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection (CBP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)).
125. Id.
126. Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 43, at 4.
127. See Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming that
"[tihe Attorney General has discretion regarding when and whether to initiate deportation
proceedings."); see also Yao v. INS, 2 F.3d 317, 319 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[a]s a
matter of statutory authority and administrative discretion, the INS is free to decide not to
commence deportation proceedings . . . .").
128. Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 43, at 5.
129. Id.
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moved from the United States or granted relief from removal and permit-
ted to remain in the country.1 30
DHS initiates removal proceedings by serving the individual with a
charging document, called a Notice to Appear, and filing it in one of
EOIR's immigration courts. 3 ' After receiving the Notice to Appear
from DHS, the court schedules a removal hearing before an immigration
judge. 132 A DHS attorney represents the government in its attempt to
meet the burden of proof needed to remove the individual from the
United States, while those attempting to be removed must find represen-
tation at their own expense.133 Although immigration judges generally
preside over removal proceedings, they also have the authority to oversee
other types of reviews and hearings.13 4 In each proceeding, review, or
hearing, they make their decisions "on a case-by-case basis according to
U.S. immigration law, regulations[,] and precedent decisions"135 and may
order the individual to be removed or may grant the individual relief
from removal.1 3 1 If removal is ordered, DHS may then remove the indi-
vidual from the United States. 3 7
When DHS decides not to "assert the full scope of the agency's en-
forcement authority in each and every case," it has made an act of
favorable prosecutorial discretion."13  Prosecutorial discretion is defined
as "the authority of an agency or officer to decide what charges to bring
130. Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. DiEp'r oF JusTciE (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/EOIRataGlance09092010.htm. The Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, the EOIR's appellate component, is the "highest administrative tribunal
for interpreting and applying U.S. immigration law" and decides appeals of immigration
judge decisions. Id. The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO)
does not hear cases related to removal proceedings, but rather cases dealing with "em-
ployer sanctions for illegal hiring of unauthorized workers, document fraud, and unfair
immigration-related employment practices." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. (defining bond redetermination hearing, rescission hearing, withholding-
only hearing, asylum-only hearing, credible fear review, claimed status review, and in ab-
stentia hearing).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 43, at 6; see Understanding Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion in Immigration Law, IMMIGR. POL'Y CENIER (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.immigra-
tionpolicy.org/just-facts/understanding-prosecutorial-discretion-immigration-law
(identifying many ways prosecutorial discretion can be exercised and identifying examples
of the favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
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and how to pursue each case."' 3 It is an administrative tool that allows
an enforcement agency to prioritize who they prosecute'40 in order to
"conserv[e] limited enforcement resources" and also "protec[t] core
American values of humanitarianism and fairness."141
In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court made it clear that an agency
has absolute discretion whether or not to prosecute or enforce a case
within criminal, civil, or administrative contexts.' 42 Within the immigra-
tion context, prosecutorial discretion may be exercised at any stage of the
enforcement process, "including, but not limited to, interrogation, arrest,
charging, detention, trial[,] and removal[,]"' 4 3 and it may take various
forms, such as the government "granting a temporary stay of removal,
joining in a motion to terminate removal proceedings, granting an order
of supervision, cancelling a Notice to Appear, or granting deferred
action."14 4
The authority of the Executive Branch to exercise prosecutorial discre-
tion-specifically in its immigration enforcement role-has been progres-
sively defined through immigration statutes, court decisions, and agency
memorandum.14' Because of the enormous impact enforcement actions
have on undocumented immigrants and their families, it is important to
develop a "sound policy on prosecutorial discretion[,]" and for it "to be
administered with strong guidelines .... "146
The INS147 relied heavily on the principles of prosecutorial discretion
in the criminal context for developing its use within the scope of immigra-
139. Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, IMMIGR. Pot.'Y
CFN3rf (May 26, 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/understanding-
prosecutorial-discretion-immigration-law.
140. See id. (describing prosecutorial discretion as the use of a priority system).
141. Leopold, supra note 80.
142. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that "an agency's deci-
sion not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion."); see also Leopold, supra note 80
(affirmatively citing Heckler v. Chaney).
143. Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 43, at 7.
144. Id.
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14); (Legacy) Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service, Operations Instructions, 0.1. 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975); Heckler, 470 U.S.
at 831; Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975).
146. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note
73, at 278 (discussing the importance of policies involving prosecutorial discretion).
147. See The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/hr_5005-enr.pdf (establishing the Department of Homeland Security); see also Crea-
tion of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. DIr'r oF HoME-LAND S17c., http://www.
dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last visited Dec. 12, 2012) (describing
how the Department of Homeland Security came into being); see also Key DHS Laws,
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tion. 148 The Meissner Memo, one of the seminal authorities on
prosecutorial discretion, relies on the Department of Justice's U.S. Attor-
ney's Manual's Principles of Federal Prosecution, which provides that
Federal prosecutors may use their discretion to depart from principles in
the manual to administer "fair and effective law enforcement" when do-
ing so is a substantial federal interest.14 9 Over the years, INS worked
towards better defining the use of prosecutorial discretion through vari-
ous memoranda, and DHS has continued that tradition, which can be
seen with the recent Morton Memo.'5 0 Consistent with the Civil Immi-
gration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, De-
tention and Removal of Aliens,s' DACA is part of a "two-pronged
initiative to implement the June 2011 Morton Memo across all DHS divi-
sions to ensure that DHS priorities remain[ ] focused on removing per-
sons who are most dangerous to the country."' 5 2
Since the immigration court dockets are currently backlogged with
nearly 300,000 pending cases, the first prong of the initiative is to admin-
istratively close, or remove from the active docket, all low priority cases
following the priority factors set forth in the Morton Memo.153 The sec-
ond prong is to issue agency-wide guidance in accordance with the Mor-
ton Memo on how to appropriately exercise discretion in these low
U.S. DEP"r oiF HoMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/key-dhs-laws (last visited Dec. 12,
2012) (detailing the laws making up the Department of Homeland Security, including the
INS); Executive Discretion, supra note 16 (discussing President Obama's use of
prosecutorial discretion in regards to undocumented immigrants that came to the United
States as children).
148. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note
73, at 268-74 (explaining that the criminal context is an important stepping-off point for
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration arena).
149. Id.
150. See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 70 (directing the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion according to agency enforcement priorities, which are focused on
promoting "security, border security, public safety, and the integrity of the immigration
system[,]" and providing a list of discretionary factors agency officers may consider for
case-by-case favorable exercises of discretion to terminate removal proceedings).
151. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm'r, INS, to Regional Directors,
District Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, and Regional and District Counsel, on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://iwp.legalmomentum.org/refer-
ence/additional-materials/immigration/enforcement-detention-and-criminal-justicegovern-
ment-documents/22092970-INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-
Meissner-11-7-00.pdf/view (describing the process to be followed for prosecutorial discre-
tion); see also Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 70 (outlining the original pro-
visions for prosecutorial discretion including priority, which agency employees may use this
discretion, and the factors to be considered).
152. Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note 139.
153. Id.
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priority cases.1 5 4 According to the Morton Memo factors, DREAMers
are a low priority.' The DACA Memo provides agency-wide guidance
in accordance with the Morton Memo to exercise prosecutorial discretion
as deferred action for DREAMers who meet certain criteria.' 56 DHS,
while declining to grant the deferral of removal of DREAMers across the
board, has clearly stated that CBP, ICE, and USCIS may defer removal
on a case-by-case basis.' 57
Deferred action is one way in which DHS may exercise prosecutorial
discretion. It is an act of administrative convenience that allows the gov-
ernment to prioritize their enforcement cases to use resources more effi-
ciently and address humanitarian concerns.' 58  When a noncitizen is
granted deferred action, DHS is deciding to refrain from taking enforce-
ment action against the individual for a specific period of time.'59 The
agency's authority to defer removal action is "founded in DHS's overall
authority for the administration and enforcement of the immigration
law . . . regulations . . . and [the] legacy of the INS Operations
Instructions."' 6
The use of deferred action in immigration was introduced in 1975 in
Lennon v. INS.16 ' This subsequently lead to the creation of deferred ac-
tion under the Operations Instructions (0.I.).162 Although the 0.1. was
154. Id.
155. DREAMers meet several positive factors outlined in the Morton Memo, includ-
ing: they are minors, have been present in the United States since childhood, have limited
ties to their home country, and they have pursued or are pursuing an education, and/or
have served in the military. Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 70.
156. See generally id. (citing the original memo that outlined prosecutorial discretion).
157. Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note 139.
158. Leopold, supra note 80.
159. Id
160. Id.
161. 527 F.2d 187, 195 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that selective prosecution may be ad-
ministered to terminate deportation). The Lennon lawsuit revealed the use of
prosecutorial discretion and the "non-priority" program. Lennon, who believed he was
being deported for political reasons (although also having overstayed his visa), requested
for non-priority status. Id. "Lennon contend[ed] that he was singled out for deportation
because of his political activities and beliefs." Id. Before the Lennon lawsuit, the non-
priority program (now deferred action) was available under the INS "Operations Instruc-
tions," but the information was private. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, supra note 73. Due to the Lennon lawsuit, INS made information about
the non-priority program public and issued guidance on deferred action. Id. at 248.
162. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note 73,
at 248 (discussing the evolution of deferred action). The 0.1. Factors for deferred action
consider:
1) advanced or tender age;
2) many years' presence in the United States;
3) physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment in the United States;
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rescinded in 1996 with the creation of IRIRA, there was no intention by
the agency to eliminate deferred action relief, and the agency has contin-
ued to utilize the factors outlined in the 0.1. in various agency memo-
randa, directing the agency's use of deferred action.16 3 Deferred action is
typically administered on a case-by-case basis; DHS however, has desig-
nated certain categories of individuals eligible for deferred action, includ-
ing battered immigrants, nonimmigrant visa applicants, academic
students affected by Hurricane Katrina, and widows and widowers of
U.S. citizens.16 DACA, despite directly targeting DREAMers as a cate-
gory, is unlike the above-mentioned categories, in that it reviews each
DREAMer on a case-by-case basis.
Deferred action as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion is a flexible
tool that may be legally utilized by the Executive Branch and DHS as a
means to affect change when Congress is gridlocked and immigration leg-
islation is failing. However, deferred action has limitations. First, it only
provides temporary relief.16 5 Second, it can be terminated at any time
pursuant to the agency's discretion.1 66 Third, deferred action does not
confer any legal immigration status upon noncitizens. 67 Lastly, discre-
tionary agency decisions, such as deferred action, have limited judicial
4) family situation in the United States effect of expulsion;
5) criminal, immoral or subversive activities or affiliations recent conduct. Id.
The governing section stated:
(ii) Deferred action. In every case where the district director determines that adverse
action would be unconscionable because of the existence of appealing humanitarian
factors, he shall recommend consideration for deferred action category."
Id.
163. Id. at 245. Some of the 2000 Meissner Memo factors to be considered in making
prosecutorial decisions like deferred action include: immigration status of the applicant;
length of residence in the United States; criminal history and circumstances surrounding
such history; humanitarian concerns such as family ties, tender age at the time of entry into
the United States, special medical conditions and circumstances in the country to which the
beneficiary could be potentially removed; likelihood of being removed; current or past
cooperation with law enforcement; service in the U.S. military; immigration history. Mem-
orandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 151. The 2011 Morton Memo is unique because
it explains who within ICE has authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion and the role of
ICE attorneys to exercise prosecutorial discretion in any immigration removal proceeding
before the EOIR. Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 70.
164. Leopold, supra note 80.
165. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide, supra note 6.
166. Rafael Carranza, Deferred Action Applications Comes with Risks: Immigration
Attorney, VALLivCENTRAL (Aug. 19, 2012, 10:52 PM), http://www.valleycentral.com/
news/story.aspx?id=790375.
167. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: A Q&A Guide, supra note 6.
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review.' These limitations present significant risks for DACA recipients
and do not promote a stable nor secure society.
First, because deferred action is only temporary, it makes it difficult for
its recipients to plan ahead for the future.1'6  For example, a DACA re-
cipient who works really hard in school and plans to go to college has no
security that her deferred action will be renewed; a recent college gradu-
ate and her potential employers have no security that her deferred action
will be renewed; and at no point can a DACA recipient have complete
assurance that in the midst of the deferred action period that DHS will
not change its mind, end deferred action, and commence removal pro-
ceedings. This affects the lives of not only the recipient, but also her
teachers, family, school friends, and employer. This instability does not
provide security for DACA recipients; it does not promote economic
growth; and it does not encourage a secure and stable society.
Second, since deferred action does not confer any legal immigration
status upon the noncitizen,'70 DACA recipients do not have access to the
benefits of citizenship, such as voting, bringing family members to the
United States, traveling, having social security benefits, health care, or a
driver's license, becoming eligible for federal jobs, or becoming an
elected official."' This prevents them from being able to fully participate
in society; a society in which many of them have much to offer, consider
their home, and to whom they want to give their full allegiance. 17 2 Be-
cause DACA confers no substantive right, immigration status, or pathway
168. Heckler held that discretionary decisions made by an agency are presumptively
unreviewable by the courts because of the unknown factors considered by the agency.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). This unreviewable presumption has been
advanced by Reno v. AADC, holding that "an [undocumented immigrant] in this country
has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as [a] defense against deporta-
tion[,]" and the INA Section 242(g) prevents judicial review over the agency's discretion-
ary decision to "execute removal orders against any alien." Wadhia, The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note 73, at 288-89.
169. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note
73, at 298 (stating that large populations of undocumented aliens have been allowed to
remain in the United States in "limbo" and are vulnerable to removal at any time); Car-
ranza, supra note 166 (stating that deferred action is discretionary and can be terminated at
any time by any administration).
170. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 4.
171. USCIS, A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION 3, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/
article/M-476.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); see The Benefits of Citizenship, MARSIALL
Acuur Eiouc., http://resources.marshalladulteducation.org/citizenship.htm (last visited
Oct. 31, 2012) (discussing the benefits of citizenship and the importance of each benefit).
172. See USCIS, A GuID- Uo NATURALIZATION, supra note 171 (reiterating the sig-
nificant benefits after gaining American citizenship).
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to citizenship, it is prevented from being called amnesty." 3 However,
this "no benefit" clause fails to consider that work authorization is a ben-
efit.1 74 Once the government decides not to remove an individual, it is in
their best interest to let those who have financial needs have the means to
provide for themselves and not become a public charge. 75 As a benefit,
work authorization should be given uniformly and according to clear
standards that may be challenged when one who appears to possess simi-
lar criteria should be eligible or in cases where denial seems arbitrary.' 7 1
Third, the government has consistently held that there is no judicial
review of an agency's discretionary decisions. ' This lack of judicial re-
view over deferred action presents serious concerns about uniformity,
equality, and responsibility. 7  Although the memorandum provides gui-
dance on the exercise of deferred action, it is still discretionary, and not
mandatory that agency officers apply it in every case.' 7 9 Because de-
ferred action is discretionary, a major concern is what responsibility
agency actors have to follow the directives.'8 o When a directive is not
mandatory or required, its application may be applied inconsistently with
the established criteria, and this causes concern that officers are making
decisions based on national origin or race.' 8 ' Without judicial review, 8 2
there is no accountability that the agency as a whole is upholding its di-
rectives consistently and equally. This is necessary for establishing a clear
standard that its recipients and their lawyers may rely on. When people
cannot predict how and when a certain directive will apply, this presents
significant risks for its potential recipients because it does not provide
stability or security.
173. Why Deferred Action is Not Amnesty, IMMI(;R. IMPACI (Aug. 13, 2012), http://
immigrationimpact.com/2012/08/13/why-deferred-action-is-not-amnesty/.
174. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note 73,
at 293-94.
175. See id. at 295 (stating that those individuals who are eligible for deferred action
are eligible for work authorization benefits and these benefits should be extended to those
who reside here indefinitely because of favorable prosecutorial discretion).
176. Id. at 293-94.
177. See Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 485, (1999) (stating that courts have little to no
review over an agency's discretionary decision).
178. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note
73, at 286-91 (discussing lack of judicial review for deferred action).
179. Id. at 292.
180. Id. at 287.
181. See id. at 286-91 (discussing generally how immigration officials have the discre-
tion to deport groups or individuals without having to reveal why they are being deported).
182. Id. Reluctance to enforce judicial review over prosecutorial discretion decisions
dates back to the nineteenth century. Id. "[Vlirtual immunity" from judicial review thus
grants federal agents a boundless and broad discretion applied to their decisions. Id.
6792013]
THE SCHOLAR
The Executive Branch has broad authority over immigration matters18
and has various tools that it may exercise to affect immigration policy and
enforcement. Deferred action is one of these tools. It allows agencies to
flexibly direct policy as society changes before the law changes. Although
the Executive Branch had the legal authority to enact DACA, the limita-
tions of deferred action being temporary, discretionary, not providing sta-
tus, and not being subject to judicial review opens DACA recipients to
significant risk. The risks of deferred action are not conclusive, but are
intensified by DACA being a non-legislative directive rather than a legis-
lative reform.
IV. THE USE OF NON-LEGISLATIVE RULES AND THEIR EFFECTS
ON DACA APPLICANTS
Although the Executive has the authority to grant administrative and
humanitarian relief through deferred action, the controversy surrounding
DACA is whether it "circumvent[ed] Congress and [abused] [Elxecutive
[Biranch authority to allow illegal immigrants to remain in the United
States"' 8 4 by creating a new law or whether it is merely an "extension and
application of current law to contemporary national needs, values and
priorities."' DACA is not a new law; it is a rule that the Executive may
use to "implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describ[e] the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of [the] agency."'1 6
183. 3A Am. Jur. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 287 (2012).
184. Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 43, at 24. Wadhia cites a letter from Lamar
Smith in which he is expressing his concerns that the agency's use of prosecutorial discre-
tion and deferred action circumvents Congress. Id. The HALT (Hinder the Administra-
tion's Legalization Temptation) Act is a congressional bill that was introduced in 2011 to
prevent DHS from granting deferred action and to "suspend" the handful of discretionary
remedies available under the immigration laws until January 21, 2013 when the bill would
expire and Obama's first presidential term would come to an end. S. 1380, 112th Cong.
(2011). However, there are others who oppose the HALT Act and who are in support of
the President's use of deferred action as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and want to
preserve the few discretionary remedies available under the immigration laws. See Letter
to Hiroshi Motomura, Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law, UCLA Law School to
the President of the United States, on Executive Authority to Grant Administrative Relief
for DREAM Act Beneficiaries (May 28, 2012), available at http://www.nilc.org/document.
html?id=754 (showing that the Executive's call for deferred action is legal and not com-
pletely opposed).
185. Seth Hoy, President Obama Issued a Directive, Not an 'Executive Order' or
'New Law', IMMIoR. IMPAcI (June 19, 2012), http://www.immigrationimpact.com/2012/06/
19/president-obama-issued-a-memo-not-an-executive-order/.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006); see VANESSA K. BuRRows & ToDD GARVEY, CONG.
RESEARCII SERv., A BRIEF OvEvIEw Oi RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (Jan. 4,
2011), available at http://www.wise-intern.orglorientation/documents/CRSrulemakingCB.
pdf (stating that agencies may promulgate rules).
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However, the agency must follow the procedures for rulemaking estab-
lished by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 8 7
The memorandum, "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA)," has been mislabeled several different things, including a presi-
dential executive order and a presidential directive' 8 An executive or-
der"' is an official document signed by the President, numbered
consecutively, and appears in the Federal Register and the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations.' 90 The order or directive is issued by the President "to
direct or instruct the actions of executive agencies or government offi-
cials, or to set policies for the Executive Branch to follow."' 9 ' Executive
orders are not subject to the restrictions of the Administrative Procedure
Act'9 2 but have the same effect of a statute, essentially making it a "law
of the land in the same manner as congressional legislation or a judicial
decision."' 9 3
A presidential directive is substantively the same as an executive order
and has the same legal effectiveness. 9 4 The difference is that "a presi-
dential directive is not styled as an executive order . . . [and] would not
187. See VANESSA K. BURROWS & Toi0 GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., A
Biusie OVERVIEW OF RULMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEw 1 (Jan. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.wise-intern.org/orientation/documents/CRSrulemakingCB.pdf (describing the
general provisions of the APA); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006)(outlining the rule making
process).
188. See Hoy, supra note 185 (showing that there is a political debate over whether
the memorandum was an executive order or merely a directive).
189. The authority for a President to use an executive order is found under Article 11
of the Constitution. U.S. CONs-r. art. 11 § 1, cl. 1 (stating that "[t]he executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America."); U.S. CONsT. art. It § 3, cl. 5
(stating that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."). Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952) (overturning a presidential
executive order and holding that executive orders are not to make new laws but further a
law put forth by Congress or the Constitution).
190. Executive Orders FAQ's, NAT'iL ARCIIIvres, http://www.archives.gov/federal-reg-
ister/executive-orders/about.htmi (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
191. See BLACK's LAw DICIIONARY 651 (9th ed. 2009) (stating the definition of exec-
utive order as, "[a]n order issued by or on behalf of the President, usu. intended to direct
or instruct the actions of executive agencies or government officials, or to set policies for
the executive branch to follow.").
192. John C. Duncan, A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of
Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 Vr. L. Rev. 333, 342 (2010).
193. Id. at 348. Executive orders provide presidents with the means of pursuing their
objectives quickly and without restrictions but that still have the effect of law. Id.
194. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., for the
Counsel to the President, on Legal Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive, As Compared
to an Executive Order (Jan. 29, 2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/olclpredirective.
him.
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automatically lapse upon a change of administration.. . A presiden-
tial directive is issued by the Office of the Chief Executive and "[may] be
published in the Federal Register, regardless of how it is styled."1 96
DACA is neither an executive order nor a presidential directive because
it was not directly administered by the President, and it has not been
published on the Federal Register as an Executive Order.197
Although DACA was submitted to the Federal Register on August 16,
2012'98 and went through the notice and comment process until it closed
on September 17, 2012,'99 DACA has not been published and has not
become a final rule. These procedures are outlined in the Administrative
Procedure Act for rulemaking. 20 The issue is whether DACA is a legis-
lative rule or a non-legislative rule.20 1 The distinction is important be-
cause it impacts DACA applicants and recipients.
There are various methods for promulgating rules, and the method
chosen by the agency affects the "procedures the agency is required to
undertake and the deference with which a reviewing court will accord the
rule."20 2 The most common procedure for promulgating legislative rules
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See 2012 Executive Orders Disposition Tables: Barack Obama - 2012, NAT'!
ARCIHfIVEs, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/2012.html (listing all
Executive Orders issued in 2012, none of which is DACA).
198. DHS and USCIS submitted an emergency information collection request on Au-
gust 16, 2012 to the Federal Register. Agency Information Collection Activities: Considera-
tion of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, Form 1-821D, New Information Collection;
Emergency Submission to the Office of Management and Budget; Comment Request, FED.
REGisiR: THE DAILY JOURNAL OF 1im [U.S.] Gov'T, available at http://www.federalre-
gister.gov/articles/201208/16/2012-20247/agency-information-collection-activities-consider-
ation-of-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals. See Request for Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, Form 1-821D, REGULATIONS.Gov., http://www.regulations.gov/#!dock-
etBrowser;dct=PS;rpp=100;so=DESC;sb=docld;po=O;D=USCIS-2012-0012 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2013) (including all comments made on Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals).
See generally A GuIDn *ro nm RULEMAKING PRoCEss, FEDERAiLREGisrIi.cov. (2011),
http://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the-rulemakingprocess.pdf (discussing fi-
nal orders).
199. All comments are posted, without change to the Federal eRulemaking Portal.
Search results for "deferred action for childhood arrivals" then select "open folder" for
Agency Information Collection Activities: Consideration of Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals, Form 1-821D; Revision of a currently approved collection. REGULATIONS.
Gov, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=USCIS-2012-0012 (last visited Feb. 27,
2013).
200. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
201. See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, lMMoIGR. EQUALITY, http://immigra-
tionequality.org/issues/immigration-basics/dacal (last visited Dec. 12, 2012) (clarifying the
difference between DACA and a legislative measure, such as the DREAM Act).
202. Buiuiows & GARVEY, supra note 187.
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is through the informal rulemaking process. 20 This method requires a
notice-and-comment procedure which ensures that the public is informed
of the proposed rules before they take effect and have an opportunity to
comment on the rule's content.204 Adequate notice is achieved by pub-
lishing a proposed rule in the Federal Register and providing "interested
persons a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking process." 2 0 5 The comment period provides the occasion for
persons to comment on the content of the proposed rule. 2 0 6 Once the
comment period closes, the agency will analyze and incorporate the rele-
vant comments and then respond with a "concise general statement" of
the "basis and purpose" of the final rule.2 07 The final rule, along with the
general statement, is then published in the Federal Register and finally
codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. 2 08 The advantages of legis-
lative rules are that they are open to judicial review and have the force
and effect of law, which makes sure the agency does not exceed their
rulemaking authority and binds them to their decisions.
Since DACA has not become a published rule or a final legislative rule
yet,2 0 9 it is not privy to judicial review and the full force and effect of law.
Instead, DACA is a non-legislative rule. Non-legislative rules are "inter-
pretative rules [or] [gleneral statements of policy" 210 that "allow agencies
to efficiently perform routine[ ] duties, while encouraging agencies to
provide the public with timely policy guidance. . . .,"21 The DHS memo-
randum 212 for DACA is a policy statement. Policy statements are "issued
by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which
203. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
204. Id. § 553(b)1-(c); see BURIOWS & GARVELy, supra note 187 (discussing the infor-
mal rulemaking process).
205. BuRRows & GARVEY, supra note 187 (citing Forester v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission, 559 F.2d 774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
206. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 553(d)(1)-(3). See A GuiDE To run RuLEMAKING PROCEss, FEDERAL RE-
GISTFR.GOV. (2011), http://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/therulemaking-pro-
cess.pdf (discussing how final rules are published, go into effect, and are integrated into the
Code of Federal Regulations).
209. Search results for "deferred action for childhood arrivals," FEOE-RALREGISTER.
Gov., http://www.federalregister.goviarticles/search?commit=Go&conditions%5Bterm%
5D=deferred+action+for+childhood+arrivals&conditions%5Btype%5D=RULE (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2013) (listing of final legislative rules, which does not include Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals).
210. BURROWS & GARVEY, supra note 187, at 7.
211. Id.
212. A memorandum is "a communication that contains directive, advisory, or in-
formative matter." MERRIAM WEnsTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
memorandum (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
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the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power" like deferred ac-
tion.' Generally, non-legislative rules "[do not] engage in the lengthy,
[and sometimes], burdensome notice-and-comment process."2 14 How-
ever, a non-legislative rule "cannot go beyond the text of a statute" and
substantively change the existing law "without first providing [adequate]
notice and comment." 2 1 5 Although this provides the agency with flexibil-
ity, non-legislative rules do not carry the full force and effect of law.
In addition to DACA not procedurally meeting the requirements of a
legislative rule, deferred action has not historically been recognized as a
legislative rule.216 Most courts have held that the INS's "Operating In-
structions, 217 which issued guidance on deferred action, was not a legis-
lative rule subject to the notice-and-comment requirement but "instead
operate[d] as an internal guideline or general statement of policy." 2 1
The one exception was the 9th Circuit in Nicolas v. INS which held that
the Operations Instructions (0.1.) operated more like "a substantive pro-
vision for relief than an internal procedural guideline ... [for] administra-
tive convenience." 2 1 9 INS later modified the 0.1. to clarify that deferred
action is a discretionary act and not a formal benefit.2 20 If the 0.1. was
not considered a legislative rule, which was more cohesive and structured
than the string of memos following its abolishment, then DACA as a sin-
gle memorandum is not likely a legislative rule either. Also, DACA is
distinguishable from the Ninth Circuit's holding in Nicolas v. INS in that
it specifically characterizes itself as an administrative convenience to pri-
oritize cases and efficiently utilize limited agency enforcement resources
rather than a substantive benefit.22 1
Second, INS proposed submitting deferred action to the rulemaking
process in 1979, but abandoned the effort in January of 1981.222 The rules
213. BURROWS & GARvEY, supra note 187, at 7.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Shoba S. Wadhia, Deferred Action in Immigration Law: The Next Generation,
IMMIGR. PIRoF. Bi-oo (June 28, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2012/
06/deferred-action-in-immigration-law-the-next-generation-by-.htmI (discussing the history
of prosecutorial discretion, a.k.a. deferred action).
217. INS, Operating Instructions, 0.1. 103.1 (a)(1)(ii) (1975).
218. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note 73,
at 282.
219. Id. at 249-50.
220. Id. at 282.
221. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that the 0.1. oper-
ated like a substantive benefit).
222. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note
73, at 284-85 (noting that INS does not want to restrict the use of deferred action to a rule
because it would be impossible to foresee all possible factors).
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would have amended Chapter 1 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, identified factors for INS officers and employees to consider when
exercising discretionary benefits, and required a favorable exercise of dis-
cretion in the absence of adverse factors.22 3 However, INS feared the
rules would "eliminate discretionary powers by converting [them] into a
body of law." 224 Therefore, the proposed rules were cancelled in order to
prevent "hampering the free exercise of discretionary authority" by sub-
jecting the flexibility of deferred action to a rigid set of factors that might
cause discretionary abuse and administrative paralysis. 225
DACA, therefore, is a non-legislative rule for procedural and historical
reasons. First, although it has gone through the notice and comment pro-
cess it has not met the requirements of a legislative rule because it has not
been published on the Federal Register, and it has not become a final
rule. Second, historically the Operations Instructions-a more cohesive
and structured policy than the current memorandums-were not held to
be a legislative rule, and INS abandoned submitting deferred action to
the rulemaking process in order to maintain its flexible nature.
Although the Executive has the authority to use non-legislative means
for directing policy regarding discretionary powers like deferred action
which provide agencies the ability to guide policy in a flexible and timely
way, there are limitations to non-legislative rules that open DACA recipi-
ents to vulnerability and risk. First, non-legislative rules do not have the
force and effect of law and are therefore "less binding and potentially
more arbitrary" which necessarily creates significant risk for those it aims
to protect.2 26 Second, when deferred action is not subject to the notice
and comment procedure, DACA recipients have no assurance that the
government will be bound by its own directive.2 27 DHS's failure to rec-
ognize deferred action as a rule has made noncitizen grantees vulnerable
to removal at a future date while also alienating a number of qualified
noncitizens from having knowledge about deferred action. Third, the
APA provides comprehensive judicial review of agency actions for legis-
lative rules; deferred action however, falls into the "exception" category
223. Id.
224. Id. at 285.
225. Id. at 284.
226. Id. at 281.
227. See Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note
73, at 283 (discussing the need to subject deferred action to the notice and comment pro-
cess so undocumented immigrants can have assurance that the government will be bound
to their directives).
228. See id. at 286 (explaining the limits that not recognizing deferred action as a
legislative rule has on undocumented immigrants).
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and is not privy to judicial review.2 29 The APA presumption of judicial
review does not apply when statutes preclude judicial review or where
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. The exercise of
deferred action has been committed to DHS by statute, and courts have
consistently held that deferred action is not open to judicial review.23 0
Lastly, there is concern that DACA has gone "beyond the text of a stat-
ute" and has substantively changed the existing law without following the
necessary procedures. DACA has been challenged by ICE agents who
have sued DHS claiming that their superiors have prevented them from
following the law by "requiring" them to administer deferred action
rather than them implement it on a discretionary basis.2 3 ' The court's
ruling could have a significant effect on the future of DACA.
The culmination of these risks encourages insecurity and instability be-
cause DACA recipients have no reliance that the directive will be upheld
in the future or that it has any binding effect. This raises great risk when
DACA requires its applicants to come out of the shadows and submit
their personal information, yet provides limited assurance that the initia-
tive can be depended upon. If DACA is cancelled, either because it is
found unconstitutional or because of a change in administrations, there is
the fear that DHS will use that information to round-up and remove
them. The non-binding and potentially temporary characteristics of non-
legislative rules and deferred action present significant risks for
DREAMers seeking to find hope and protection in DACA.
V. CONcLusION: WHAT To Do WITH DACA
Although the Executive Branch has the legal authority to exercise de-
ferred action within their prosecutorial discretion and may implement
that policy by non-legislative means, DACA is a policy that creates risk,
vulnerability, and instability. The end goal of relief for DREAMers
should be to provide relief that is secure and stable so that they can plan
for their future, live a life without fear, know that their hard work will be
of value, and that allows them to be a dependable player in society. It is
also relief that considers the issues facing the immigration system by not
encouraging future illegal immigration and upholds the integrity of a sys-
tem where applicants have been waiting in line for years to legally come
229. BURROWS & GARVEY, supra note 187, at 9.
230. INA § 242(g); Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 471 (1999); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 837 (1984).
231. See ICE Agents v. Napolitano, Complaint, Civil Action No. 3:12-CV- 03247-0
(U.S. Dist. Ct. Dallas, 2012), amended Oct. 10, 2012; available at http://www.numbersusa.
com/content/files/AmendedComplaint.pdf (outlining the suit brought against the U.S.
government to declare the DACA directive unlawful and unconstitutional).
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to the United States.2 32 DACA is not that type of relief. It is a means to
an end that misses the bull's-eye. It is a unilateral policy that ignores the
political environment, further divides the parties, and is only a Band-Aid
remedy to the deeper problems that constitute the broken immigration
system. This mediocre form of relief opens R.H. and other DREAMers
to significant risk, instability, and vulnerability.
The problem with DACA is not whether it can be done, but whether it
should be done. This Comment has discussed that 1) Congress has pro-
vided for the use of deferred action in the area of immigration, and that it
is a form of relief that has been used consistently since the 1970s to con-
sider humanitarian values and more efficiently use agency resources;233
and 2) that DHS has been given rulemaking powers to flexibly and effi-
ciently direct policy such as the use of deferred action.23 4 Therefore, the
Executive Branch may legally use memoranda, such as DACA, to direct
the agency to exercise their prosecutorial discretion as deferred action
when enforcing the law against undocumented individuals who came to
the United States as children. However, because of the limitations of de-
ferred action and non-legislative rules, the DACA initiative is a policy
that creates risk and perpetuates instability, insecurity, and vulnerability.
The risks of DACA are that it only provides temporary relief; it is dis-
cretionary and can be terminated at any time; it does not confer any legal
immigration status; it has limited judicial review; it does not have the
force and effect of law; it is not binding; and its future viability is ques-
tionable.2 35 About 180,000 DREAMers have applied for deferred action,
and only 4,591 of those requests were approved as of October 2012.236 In
order to prevent current and future recipients and applicants, like R.H.,
from the risks that DACA presents, DHS should publish "Deferred Ac-
tion for Childhood Arrivals" on the Federal Register and use the infor-
mal rulemaking procedures of Section 553 of the APA to make it a final
rule. This would allow for an inclusive discussion on the merits of the
proposed rule, better educate the public on its merits, and provide the
232. See IMMIGRATION POUCY CENTElR, BREAKING DOWN THE PRouEms, supra
note 11 (explaining the failures and limitations of the current immigration system).
233. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (noting that Congress had the
plenary power to decide the outcome of immigration issues within the United States).
234. See BURROWS & GARVEY, supra note 187 (proposing that federal agencies have
broad discretion to implement various policies and rules).
235. Id. at 9.
236. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, USCIS.c;ov (Oct. 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration %
20Forms%2OData/All%2OForm%20Types[DACA/DACAOct2O12.pdf.
237. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, supra note 73,
at 279.
2013] 687
THE SCHOLAR
opportunity for judicial review.2 38 It would also provide greater over-
sight, accountability, and transparency to make sure that immigration of-
ficers are implementing deferred action consistently and judiciously.239
Legislators, politicians, lawyers and immigration advocates should con-
tinue working for DREAM Act legislative reform because that is the
method that provides the most stability and security for DREAMers.2 4 0
This will require cooperation and compromise that must be made on both
sides. However, these methods may take a long time. Therefore, in the
interim DACA is a legitimate form of relief that is available and which
DREAMers should consider. However, it is not an option that is without
risks. Accordingly, it is important that applicants and their lawyers are
knowledgeable of the application process and fully aware of the risks de-
ferred action presents. At the end of the day, the decision to take on the
risks of applying belongs to the applicant and his or her family.
238. Id. at 265.
239. Id.
240. See Barron, supra note 45, at 647-48 (highlighting the importance of bipartisan
cooperation to ensure the DREAM Act's future); Humberto Sanchez, Dick Durbin Open
to Working With Marco Rubio on DREAM Act, Roiu. CALL (Apr. 26, 2012, 3:48 PM),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/dickdurbinopen to working-with marco_rubio_on_dream
act-214136-1.htmi (noting a Democratic legislator's plea for bipartisan support in order to
pass the DREAM Act); The DREAM Act, IMMIGR. POL'Y CENTEREi, http://www.immigra-
tionpolicy.org/just-facts/dream-act (last updated May 18, 2011) ("For the DREAM Act to
pass, it would likely need the support of both the moderate Republicans who supported it
in the past, as well as the Democrats .... ").
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